THE WAYS of REASON

The Classic Guide to Talmud Study

Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto

What the Gedolim say...

The appearance of an English translation fulfills a vital need in making this sefer accessible as an educational tool for teachers and students alike.

Rabbi Chaim P. Scheinberg

Yeshiva Torah Or

It is possible to succeed by means of this book in bringing back those who are far away from the Torah to enter into the ways of studying and understanding the Gemorrah. Experience and proven success show us that there is in this book a great benefit and reward.

Rabbi S. Z. Broide

Hebron Yeshiva

The translation is exact and true to the

original text. Countless hours of work have

been invested to produce a faithful and

authoritative expression of the author's

intent.

Rabbi Mordecai Goldstein

Diaspora Yeshiva

THE WAYS OF REASON

In today's world, there is a proliferation of guides to Torah study and an increasing interest in Jewish education. However, only a Torah Giant of the stature of the Ramchal, Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto could write a guide which takes up the challenge to make Talmudic learning accessible to every Jew. The Ways of Reason provides the reader with the tools of thinking, unlocking the doors which lead to the crown of Torah. This is not a book in which one can read more "about" Torah study and Judaism. Rather, it is an invitation to the reader to participate and experience the excitement of learning Gemorrah. Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzato writes that much of the knowledge of how words communicate ideas may be an inherent and natural part of our intelligence. Nonetheless, making a systematic and conscious study of words and ideas has many benefits. It adds clarity of understanding and increases one's ability to see and consider openly alternative possibilities. It enables one to create innovative understandings that bring words alive. Such a study also prevents error and makes critical thinking and evaluation possible. It increases speed and accuracy allowing one to get the point quickly without aimless wandering. We decided to write an English translation of this classic work in light of all the tremendous benefit that may be derived from its study.

ABOUT THE TRANSLATORS

Rabbi Sackton holds a degree in Philosophy, and came to Israel from Texas in 1970 to continue his studies. He received Rabbinical S'micha in 1987 from the Diaspora Yeshiva. Rabbi Tscholkowsky is trained in the field of education and taught high school in New York. He has been studying and teaching in Israel since 1970, and also received Rabbinical S'micha from the Diaspora Yeshiva in 1987. Both authors are currently on the staff of the Diaspora Yeshiva in Jerusalem where they give shiurim in Talmud.

Copyright 1989 Rabbi David Sackton and Rabbi Chaim  Tscholkowsky

Diaspora Yeshiva Torah Yisrael, Mount Zion, POB 6426, Jerusalem, Israel 91063

Distributed by Feldheim Publishers
ISBN 0-87306-495-X
Pages 260 (approx.)

The Knowing Heart

With the completion of this translation of The Knowing Heart, a trilogy of important works by R. Moshe Chayim Luzzatto, one of the great minds in religious Jewish thought, has joined Feldheim's Torah Classics Library series.

First came his Mesillat Yesharim (The Path of the Just), that guides the faithful Jew up a ladder of steady personal development to sublime levels of devotion and holiness.

Yet spiritual growth is not, by itself, the only goal for a Torah Jew. There must also be knowledge of the Creator's ways and the dynamics of interaction between the human and the Divine. Luzzatto's Derech haShem (The Way of God) is an enlightening exposition on the Divine regulation of the world and the integral role of Torah and mitzvoth.

Luzzatto explains that knowledge is gained by the intellect. Then it must influence the heart until it moves and exalts the soul, the very essence of a human being. Da'ath Tevunoth was written in 5494 (1734), as a dialogue between the intellect and the soul — hence its English title, The Knowing Heart.

Focusing on the profundity of meaning that lies in the unique oneness of God, the author brings the reader to a new awareness of the transcendental significance of the teaching that man was created in the Divine image. This is a work written, not to satisfy idle curiosity or empty philosophical speculation, but to give the earnest, searching student a vital foundation for a life imbued with the holiness and knowledge of Hashem. As always, the author draws widely on the Written and Oral Torah, and the sacred traditions of kabbala.

The Hebrew text, taken from the highly accurate edition of R. Chaim Friedlander (based on three early manuscripts), is printed with full vowelization (nikkud). On facing pages is the faithful, literate English translation by Shraga Silverstein, whose translations of Mesillat Yesharim and Shaarei Teshuvah have earned him a deserved reputation for quality.

The Way of God

Out of the probing, revealing world of kabbala came a wealth of teachings on the profoundest mysteries that confront the Jewish mind: the how and why of the world, the finite in the infinite, and the origin and purpose of human life on earth.

With the Torah, we grow aware of the Almighty as Creatorand Regulator of the world. Yet how does His power operate? What forces, channels or modalities mediate between the human and the Divine?

In Derech Hashem, R. Moshe Chayim Luzzatto organizes the first clear, systematic outline of traditional Jewish thought concerning the interaction between the earthly and the heavenly, between man and Hashem. With his sensitive, luminous style, the author combines the light of kabbala with an in-depth study of the goals of Creation, man's primal sin, the ways of Divine justice, and the interdependent relationship between the tzaddik (the righteous) and the rasha (the wicked). He also elaborates on the World-to-Come, ultimate redemption in the Divine order, and the unique role of Torah and mitzvoth in man's interaction with the Divine.

R. Moshe Chayim Luzzatto, born in Padua, Italy in 1707, was regarded as a genius from childhood. After mastering Tanach and Talmud, Midrash and halacha, he studied kabbala with R. Isaiah Bassani until he had an unparalleled command of the entire field.

After moving to Amsterdam in 1731, Luzzato began writing a series of works, including Derech Hashem, while earning his living grinding optical lenses. In this edition, for the first time, the text is presented fully vowellized (menukad), with a careful English translation by Aryeh Kaplan on facing pages.

About the Translator

An alumnus of New York's Torah Vodaath and Mir yeshivas, Aryeh Kaplan A"H received S'micha from some of the foremost rabbinical authorities in Israel. He also earned an M.A. in physics.

Aryeh Kaplan was in the forefront of bringing Torah to the English-speaking Jewish masses, with his prolific writing and translations. Just a few of his published works are as follows: Me'am Lo'ez, Waters of Eden, Sabbath — Day of Eternity, Tefillin, Light Beyond, Handbook of Jewish Thought, and Living Torah.

Other books by

R. Moshe Chayim Luzzatto in Feldheim Publishers' Torah Classics Library series

Mesillat Yesharim

Mesillat Yesharim has been treasured for centuries as the priceless legacy from R. Moshe Chayim Luzzato to the Jewish people, giving the key to complete spiritual development.

The framework for this book is taken from a luminous, intriguing passage by R. Pinchas ben Yair, in the Talmud: "Torah leads to watchfulness; watchfulness leads to zeal; zeal leads to cleanliness; cleanliness leads to separation; separation leads to purity; purity leads to saintliness; saintliness leads to humility; humility leads to fear of sin; fear of sin leads to holiness; holiness leads to the revival of the dead." From this, the author fashions a master-crafted ladder upon which a Jew can begin at the lowest rung and climb to the very heights of Divine worship.

Few could equal Luzzato in his mastery of Tanach, Talmud and kabbala; and none could match his ability to fuse these sources into a single stream of flowing, inspiring thought. Step by step, with poetic sensitivity, the author examines each segment of the Talmud that deals with human character, including its motives — known and unknown — and multiple facets that make up a person.

What emerges is a work of infinite wisdom derived from a masterful overview of the Torah, a work whose compassion and insight have given it a timeless place of honor in the wealth of our Jewish heritage.

Taken from the first edition (Amsterdam, 1740), the Hebrew text appears with full vowelization (nikkud), together with the careful, precise translation of Shraga Silverstein on facing pages.

About the Translator

An alumnus of Mesivta Rabbi Chaim Berlin, Shraga Silverstein also holds a B.A. and an M.A. from Brooklyn College, where he graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa. In 1963, he settled with his family in Jerusalem, where he became an instructor in a foremost school of advanced Jewish education and a lecturer in English at Hebrew University.

In addition to this book, Shraga Silverstein has completed a sound translation of Shaarei Teshuvah (The Gates of Repentance) by Rabbeinu Yonah and Daath Tevunoth (The Knowing Heart) by R. Moshe Chayim Luzzatto, for publication in Feldheim Publishers' Torah Classics Library series. He is the author of Hear My Son!, a collection of original aphorisms, and The Antidote: Human Sexuality in a Torah Perspective, a Feldheim Publishers book.

The Ways of Reason

A guide to the Talmud and the foundations of dialectics

explaining all the principles of reason and logic

in a simple and concise way, conceived and written by

the exhalted and renowned

Rabbenu Moshe Chaim Luzzatto zt'l

with English translation and explanatory charts prepared by Rabbi David Sackton and Rabbi Chaim Tscholkowsky

Diaspora Yeshiva

Feldheim Publishers

Jerusalem, Israel

This book is dedicated to:

Mr. & Mrs. Larry and Marsha Roth

and their children,

David, Hannah and Daniel

LETTER OF APPROBATION

Rabbi CHAIM P. SCHEINBERG             

KIRYAT MATTERSDORF                                   

PANIM MEIROT 2                             

JERUSALEM, ISRAEL                                                 

BS"D 7 Menachem Av 5748

Derech T'vunos is a classic guide to the study of Talmud written by one of our great Sages, the Ramchal. The nature of the work is defined by the author himself as an analysis of Talmudic thought which will be a great help to a student who has not reached proficiency in Torah study as well as to the experienced student. The translation is designed to present the Ramchal's method in an organized fashion in order to facilitate its study.

The appearance of an English translation fulfills a vital need in making this sefer accessible as an educational tool for teachers and students alike. The translators are to be commended for undertaking this exacting and laborious task and completing what will surely be a great help to those who wish to embark upon and pursue the study of Torah. Although I do not give Haskomos in any way, I do give my blessing to this project. May Rabbi David Sackton and Rabbi Chalm Tscholkowsky be blessed with the ability to continue in their work to spread the teachings of our holy Torah.

Rabbi Chaim P. Schelnberg

Preface

Rabbi Mordecai Goldstein, Shlita Rosh HaYeshiva of the Diaspora Yeshiva

Of all our great Sages, Rabbi Akiva is most noted for his meteoric ascent from total ignorance of the Torah to the greatest heights of learning. What was the secret of his extraordinary accomplishment? The answer to this mystery is revealed by Rabbi Yehudah the Prince in Avos d'Rabbi Nossan (18:1).

Rabbi Yehudah the Prince said of Rabbi Akiva, "he is a storehouse bursting with knowledge". Rashi (Gittin 67a) describes this "storehouse" as analogous to "a large crate which is divided into compartmentalized boxes". The secret to Rabbi Akiva's success was his system of classifying and categorizing concepts and terms in a Torah thinking process with which he brought clarity to his vast knowledge.

Rabbi Yehudah expands his characterization of Rabbi Akiva with the following metaphor. "To what may Rabbi Akiva be compared? He is like a poor man who takes his basket out to the field. He finds some barley, reaps it and puts it in his basket; he finds some wheat, reaps it and puts it in his basket, and similarly with beans and lentils. When he returns to his house, he sorts them all according to kind. Such was the unique quality of Rabbi Akiva when he learned from his Rabbis. Having heard an explanation of the Written Law, followed by an explanation of Halachah, followed by one from the Midrash and another from Aggadah, he listened carefully, reviewed and absorbed all this knowledge until he gained complete mastery of it". Rashi explains the comparison to a poor man (Gittin 67a): Rabbi Akiva 'learned everything in a jumbled manner and only then set himself the task of formulating and organizing what he had learned". Like a poor man seeking his sustenance, Rabbi Akiva gathered every morsel. In his tremendous desire for knowledge, he did not neglect any tidbit. A rich man whose task is to harvest barley does not turn aside from his appointed task to pick up a few peas or beans which he may happen to find in the field, nor does he have the task of sorting out each kind afterwards as a poor man must do. Thus, out of necessity, Rabbi Akiva came to profound insights into the learning process which enabled him to absorb vast Torah knowledge. By abstracting general rules and revealing the foundations of what he had learned, Rabbi Akiva found a process of dialectics and specialized terminology.

This innovative process was not only of great benefit to himself, but also enabled his students to learn everything which he handed down to them from his teachers, incorporating all the work which he had done himself.

The text in Avos d'Rabbi Nossan quoted above concludes, Rabbi Akiva "did not say, I shall first learn the Written Law alone, and only then the Midrash alone". Instead he learned everything together as it was taught to him. In the end, "when Rabbi Akiva had become a great scholar, he turned the whole Torah into rings upon rings linked together, comparable to handles with which large vessels may be held. He organized the Midrash, the Sifri, and the Sifra independently, and then taught his students each one separately. He did the same with Halachah and Aggadah, organizing and teaching each one separately." It is interesting that he "did not say, I shall first learn the Written Law alone, and only then the Midrash alone". And yet we see that his final goal was indeed just that - to teach his students the Midrash, Sifri, Sifra and then the Halachah separately and independently. From this we see that the lack of systematic thinking is a common cause for a student's inability to grasp and absorb knowledge. And yet, Rabbi Akiva did not let the jumble of concepts and information which he received from his teachers become a factor which impeded his learning. On the contrary, he reviewed everything he learned until he became thoroughly familiar with it and "created" order and a clear "method" of Torah thinking out of disorder.

The significance of the classic The Ways of Reason by Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto, one of our greatest "later authorities", is that it provides the student with a Torah system of classification and categorization of conceptual ideas and terminology. These terms and methods are the "rings and handles" with which to acquire and handle Torah knowledge. The Ways of Reason gives us the tools which will allow anyone who studies this method to apply the formula of our Sages of blessed memory and follow in Rabbi Akiva's ways.

One of the unique ideas that is an innovation of the Diaspora Yeshiva is something I like to call "conscious learning", an awareness of the true nature of Torah learning. By recognizing the forms and structures which underlie the learning process, we have the tools for thinking and experiencing the Torah, which it is our privilege to learn. When the logical steps and abstractions of thinking are laid out in an open and honest way, there are endless insights and revelations which wait to be uncovered in every word of Torah, like messages sent to us by the Almighty Himself. Such a conscious awareness must, by definition, bring a dimension of excitement and vibrancy to our learning. For these insights are not part of a mystique guarded only for the privileged few. Everyone who devotes himself to the study of Torah must, by definition, produce his own novel insights. All that is required is that we follow the formulas and instructions of our Sages.

Translators' Foreword

The Creator of the universe revealed His will to us on Mount Sinai through the Torah. The Torah is expressed in words. Therefore, to understand His will, you must know how words work. There is a riddle here, for just as the Creator has no end, so His Torah has no end, and yet the infinite Torah is contained in a finite space. The Torah is expressed in a limited number of words, in the 304,840 letters of the Written Law and 2711 pages of the Oral Law. The answer to this riddle is that when you know how words work, the words come alive, and then the words of the Torah can be the medium through which you can understand the will of the Creator.

This is a book about how words work. It guarantees to every Jew his innate potential to receive the Torah from Mount Sinai. The Rambam writes in the Laws of Talmud Torah (Chap. 3, Halachah 1), "The Jewish people are crowned with three crowns: the crown of Torah, the crown of Priesthood, and the crown of Kingship. The crown of Priesthood belongs to Aharon and his children forever, and the crown of Kingship belongs to David and his children forever. But the crown of Torah remains unclaimed and available. Whoever so desires can come and claim it." The crown of Torah is not an exclusive inheritance; there are no barriers to its attainment. Anyone with the desire and aspiration can strive to be among the great Torah scholars of each generation.

In today's world, there is a proliferation of guides to Torah study and an increasing interest in Jewish education. However, only a Torah giant of the stature of Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto could write a guide which takes up the Rambam's challenge to make Talmudic learning accessible to every Jew.

The Ways of Reason provides the reader with the tools of thinking, unlocking the doors which lead to the crown of Torah. This is not a book in which one can read more "about" Torah study and Judaism. Rather, it is an invitation to the reader to participate and experience the excitement of learning Gemorah. Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto writes that much of the knowledge of how words communicate ideas may be an inherent and natural part of our intelligence. Nonetheless, making a systematic and conscious study of words and ideas has many benefits. It adds clarity of understanding and increases one's ability to see and consider openly alternative possibilities. It enables one to create innovative understandings that bring words alive. Such a study also prevents error and makes critical thinking and evaluation possible. It increases speed and accuracy, allowing one to get the point quickly without aimless wandering. We decided to write an English translation of this classic work in light of all the tremendous benefit that may be derived from its study.

Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto is best known for his classic work on ethics, Mesilas Yesharim, which explains the practical steps to be followed towards the attainment of human perfection. As the Gaon of Vilna declared, such a practical guide could only have been composed by someone who had walked the path of righteousness to its very end. Had he been alive at the time of Rabbi Luzzatto, the Gaon added, he would have traveled on foot from Vilna to Italy to be his student even for a day. The Ways of Reason bears the stamp of the master in its exacting organization and systematic explanation of the subject, which never deviates from the realm of practical application. This is indeed a measure of his great wisdom that every aspect of learning is brought into reality to be fulfilled and applied. In this respect, The Ways of Reason is unsurpassed as a guide to Talmudic study since it provides a practical bridge between logic and the Talmudic method. Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto is also not alone among our Sages in choosing to write a book on logic. The Rambam before him wrote on logic and the Vilna Gaon after him.

The Ways of Reason has been "required reading" in the Diaspora Yeshiva for many years and is used extensively by its students. It has been a tool which provides the student with a clear grasp of Talmudic thinking and erudition. Our rabbi and teacher Rabbi Mordecai Goldstein, while maintaining the highest standards of scholarship, has opened the doors of the Diaspora Yeshiva long before the "Baale T'shuvah" movement became popular. Thus, he has made the crown of Torah a lofty goal attainable to all who desire to study. The translators have taught classes in Talmud at the Diaspora Yeshiva for many years and have had considerable success in opening the field of Torah study to all students through the application of the Ramchal's system of Torah thinking. Indeed, Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto himself, in his introduction, states that the purpose of his work is to make the mastery of Talmud study quicker and easier for the beginner, as well as for the experienced student.

Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto's depth and precision in choosing each and every word cannot be overstated. This very conciseness of the original work has demanded more lengthy explanation in English in order to convey the intended meaning clearly. This is particularly true in the examples quoted from the Talmud. We must emphasize, as the author does in his introduction, that this is a book to be studied. It will be found that the Ramchal's system of categorizing ideas is not a mechanical process which can be a substitute for thinking. On the contrary, it facilitates deeper delving into a text by opening the range of possible interpretations. We have provided, as a study aid, an appendix containing outlines of each chapter together with a general index and an index of Hebrew terms. The charts in Hebrew and English show the overall structure of the book and the relationship between key concepts. It is important to progress through this guide step by step so that the number of distinctions and categories will not appear overwhelmingly complex. There are many terms used in the book in a specialized sense, and they are defined in the body of the text. At the point where the terms are defined, they appear in bold type. It is important to recognize the broad scope of the Ram-chal's terminology. Thus, for example, the terms subject and predicate are not meant simply in a grammatical sense. Likewise, in the treatment of logical deductions, the Ramchal goes beyond the rules of validity to consider the basis on which statements should be accepted as true.

We wish to express our gratitude and acknowledgement to the Rosh HaYeshiva, Rabbi Mordecai Goldstein, who has guided us throughout our work. It is only through his teachings that we have come to understand the value of this book and put it to use. Whatever we have been able to do in helping others on the path of learning Torah is his doing. To the many people who have participated in this project, we express our heartfelt gratitude. In particular, we are indebted to our wives and our dear parents for their immeasurable support.

We offer thanks to the Almighty, who has brought us to the completion of this book and given us the merit to sit in the beis ha-midrash. May it be His will that this book serves to return His people to His holy Torah.

Rabbi David Sackton Rabbi Chaim Tscholkowsky Diaspora Yeshiva Mount Zion, Jerusalem

Author's Introduction

The pleasure in discovering truth is a natural trait of the intelligent soul that exists in every one of us. Any normal person, then, will make the utmost effort to reveal the true nature of anything he observes and banish falsehood.

If truth were self-evident, we could gain wisdom by simple observation. The more we observed the world around us, the wiser we would be. But, in fact, whether we consider the observer or what he observes, this is not true. For all objects must be considered in terms of many different logical aspects, both intrinsic and relational, all of which are equally true. For example, the shape of a table and its measurements, length, width and so forth, are intrinsic aspects of a table. The use, worth, and age of a table are relational aspects.

To complicate matters even further, not all aspects are equally apparent. Some are readily observable through our senses, others less so, requiring great effort to discern them. The problem is compounded in the objects themselves, because the same aspect that is apparent in one object may be hidden in another. For example, the use of a table is readily apparent, i.e., food and utensils are placed on it; similarly, the use of bread, i.e., it sustains mankind. However, the use of many wild plants can only be known, if at all, after long and intensive investigation. Thus we see that there is no object so apparent in all its aspects that its true nature can be understood solely through superficial observation.

Aside from these difficulties, experience shows us that many people imagine false ideas to be absolutely true. They generally remain firm in their beliefs, refusing to see anything wrong with them. After initial study, a person may think that his ideas are clear and true, and only afterwards does he find them false and have to retract them. We can therefore say with certainty that the true nature of things is neither apparent nor readily understood, and there is, in fact, considerable room for mistakes, for what is false may appear true, and the human mind is not always discriminating enough to hit upon the truth. The mind, in fact, may even turn aside from the path of truth without being aware of doing so.

In light of this, it is beneficial for a person to find guidelines and a method to keep himself on the straight path without straying. For if he does carelessly go astray, he will, after thorough observation, be able to consciously recognize his error and return to the path. The basis of this method is the systematic compilation of all logical categories of things, explaining their functions and rules as they really are. This method is a guide, leading the mind unfalteringly in the search for wisdom. This is exactly what our rabbis of blessed memory meant when they praised King Solomon for making "handles for the Torah" (Eruvin 21b). He was able to acquire a large measure of knowledge with ease through the application of short, concise and properly ordered rules. Now do not think that these principles are so profound that they are beyond the understanding of ordinary people. On the contrary, they are extremely simple and obvious. My sole innovation in this book is the step of conscious awareness and organization. Even though all these rules are really natural laws of thinking, they cannot help anyone unless they are consciously used and organized as a tool. Once they are properly organized, a person has the "handles" with which to easily grasp the most profound and intricate ideas, as I explained earlier.

When I became aware of the great benefit and necessity of this study, I was moved to compose this small work. Anyone who wants to approach it seriously will enhance his own learning, and his teaching of others. However, he must not minimize the task, for the way of the uneducated is to view everything simplistically. Read my words carefully and master every concept, for I have not been lax in choosing my words with exactness in order to express each point in the clearest possible way. My intention has been to arrange and explain the methods of understanding and knowledge in a style that is brief, yet sufficient. The goal of this method is to recognize truth and embrace it, and to uncover falsehood and reject it.

The Talmud is like a vast ocean set before us, whose arguments are mighty waves, whose laws roll forth rising to the heavens and plunging to the depths. Through the forward movement of these strong currents the Truth of Torah is clarified and distilled - this is called the Holy Way. It is in the Talmud that I have chosen to base my building, so that my method will be successful and immutable. This Torah method, then, is the paradigm for all understanding and wisdom.

I will explain in detail the foundations of analytical argument in the Talmud and principles of its dialectic thought. This will help anyone who is not already familiar with Talmud study and desires to embark upon it directly and easily. If he begins his study with the aid of this little book, he will find the avenues of Talmudic law open to him, and he will travel along them without needless detour. What might have taken long hours, great concentration, and hard work to acquire can be achieved with a minimum of time and effort, for he will be tremendously aided by an organized method and classification of ideas. Even someone who is already accustomed to Torah study may occasionally be kept from falling into error.

For this reason I have named this book in accordance with its main idea, The Ways of Reason.

May the Almighty, who is the source of all knowledge and understanding, grant us knowledge, wisdom and understanding so that we may fear Him, do His will and serve Him with a complete heart for all eternity. Amen. May His will be so.

Chapter One

THE TALMUDIC METHOD

Dialectic investigation is the process of analyzing a statement or idea in order to explain and clarify its truth or falsity. This process consists of setting forth all possible arguments which validate and establish the statement or nullify and disprove it. An arrangement must be chosen which will test the relative strengths of the arguments pro and con. Finally, the question must be resolved on the side that appears most pleasing to the mind.

This investigation can be conducted among many people, with one taking one side of the argument and the other opposing him; i.e., one endeavors to prove a statement and the other to disprove it, each opponent setting forth his argument to answer the other, point for point. It is also possible for one person to conduct the argument by himself, filling in each side. He proposes an initial statement, and then considers every possible rebuttal that might be made by a person holding the opposite point of view. He then disproves each of his own arguments, and returns to establish his original statement.

Both these styles are found in the arguments and disputes of the Talmud. For sometimes many rabbis debate one topic, some posing difficulties and the others answering, while at other times the Talmud itself questions and answers as if different rabbis were arguing an issue. At times the Talmud states explicitly, "The same one who asks has given the answer". That is, the one who presents a problem solves it himself.

However, all these forms of debate lead to the same end, i.e., the clarification of the truth by means of arranging every argument point for point. One judges a difficulty whether it is raised by someone else against a stated thought or the person raises a difficulty against himself in the same way. Similarly, with the resolution of any difficulty, there is no difference whether it is his own or someone else's. The same is true for every other element of dialectics, for we never judge a statement by its author, but only on its own merit.

Chapter Two

ELEMENTS OF DEBATE

Every Talmudic discussion is built from seven principal elements of dialectic reasoning. They are: Statement, Question, Answer, Contradiction, Proof, Difficulty and Resolution.

Statement - the speaker states a single idea.

Question - a person asks another a point of information.

Answer - the person asked responds to the question.

Contradiction - the speaker disproves a statement and totally refutes it.

Proof - the speaker presents evidence from which the truth of a statement or idea is made apparent.

Difficulty -a person points out something untrue or unpleasing in a statement or idea.

Resolution - a person turns aside the difficulty raised against a statement or idea.

Each of these elements has subcategories which will be explained later with the help of the Almighty.

It must be noted that dialectics are founded on first principles which are naturally found in our mind, and which lead us to an understanding of any statement, and to an acceptance or rejection of ideas. Every difficulty and resolution, every proof and disproof and all other parts of argumentation mentioned above are built on these foundations.

For example, the Mishnah states (Berachos 15a), "One who read the Sh'ma without hearing his own words fulfills his obligation". The Gemorah infers, "One who read, that is, one who has already read, fulfills his obligation; however, in the first instance, he should read so as to hear what he says". This inference is based on the conceptual image which our minds construct from the words of the Mishnah, i.e.,the intention is to refer to someone who has already read.

The opposite inference is made in the Gemorah (Chullin 2a). The Mishnah states, "Anyone may perform ritual slaughter and his slaughter is kosher". The Gemorah infers, "Anyone may perform ritual slaughter, that is, even in the first instance". Here, the nature of the language, "Anyone may slaughter", indicates that the Mishnah refers even to the first instance.

Another Gemorah (Pesachim 4^a) presents a difficulty based on similar principles. Rav Nachman bar Yitzhak was asked: If one rents a house to his neighbor on the fourteenth of Nissan, does it have the legal status of having been checked for leaven? He answered by quoting a text: All are believed concerning the removal of leaven. The Gemorah presents a difficulty, "The fact that all are believed does not answer the question! It must be established that all houses have the legal status of having been checked for leaven". This difficulty is based on a natural principle of language. The phrase "All are believed" tells us that the desired law is dependent upon the factor that everyone is believed about checking for leaven. However, on the other hand, the presumption of the Talmud is that the desired law is dependent upon another factor, that the houses have a legal status of having been checked. To express the latter factor properly, the nature of language demands that we use the phrase "All the houses have the legal status of having been checked".

If the matter is investigated well, it will be apparent that every single difficulty and resolution and all the other elements of dialectics are founded on similar principles. These principles of language are inherent in the nature of intellectual understanding, for the human mind itself dictates their necessity even without study.

There are three processes that the mind uses in pursuit of understanding.

The first is the building of a complete picture of the subject and an exact understanding of statements and ideas as they are intended (Chapters Three - Six).

The second is the derivation of new ideas from a stated premise (Chapter Seven).

The third is the acceptance or rejection of each premise and conclusion on the basis of proof (Chapter Eight).

In each of these processes the mind proceeds according to natural principles as we mentioned, and as we shall see further with the help of the Almighty. Now we will explain each process individually in detail.

Chapter Three:

TYPES OF STATEMENTS

Chapter Three

Every conceivable statement, idea, or thought is necessarily constructed from two parts: a certain matter which is affirmed or denied, and a thing upon which it is affirmed or denied.

For example, (Berachos 20b) "Rav Ada bar Ahavah said, "Women are obliged to fulfill the mitzvah of kiddush". Here, a specific concept (the obligation to fulfill the mitzvah of kiddush) is affirmed in relation to a certain subject (that is, the category of women).

We call that which is affirmed or denied the Predicate, and the thing upon which it is affirmed or denied we call the Subject. Accordingly, the subject of this statement is women, and the predicate is the obligation of kiddush.

With respect to subject or predicate all statements may be classified in different categories.

Statements are divided into three types according to their subjects: categorical, particular and partial.

Categorical Statements have as their subjects an entire class consisting of many particulars. The predicate of the statement must apply to all of them.

For example, (Sanhedrin 90a) "All Jews have a portion in the world to come". This statement encompasses many particulars (every Jewish person) in a class, and predicates upon all of them that they have a portion in the world to come.

Particular Statements have as their subjects one individual entity.

For example, (Nega'im Chapter 12 Mishnah 4) 'Jerusalem does not become ritually impure through plagues".

Partial Statements are those whose subjects contain only part of one class.

For example, (Yebamos 84a) "Some women are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to perform the leverite marriage". The meaning of this statement is that the predicate - that they are permitted to their husbands and forbidden to perform leverite marriage - is only applied to a part of the entire class of women.

There are also unqualified statements that have the same force as a categorical statement even though their subjects are not qualified by the word all.

For example, (Berachos 20b) "Women are obliged to fulfill the mitzvah of kiddush". It is understood from this statement that all women are obliged to fulfill the mitzvah of kiddush.

Statements are divided into eleven types according to their predicates. Each of these types is distinct because all predicates are not applied to their subjects in the same way; rather, each different formula which is used implies a different type of predication.

1.   Simple Statement. The category of statements whose predicates are applied to their subjects without any condition or limitation, as is seen in the previously mentioned examples and other similar statements.

2.  Qualified Statement. In this category of statements the application of the predicate to the subject ranges from definitive to tentative. In one instance, the predicate may be stated as a certainty or a necessity. In the absence of certainty the predicate may be stated as a possibility.

For example, (Pesachim 9b) "Since weasels and martens are commonly found, they certainly dragged away the fetus before the Cohen arrived".

(Kesubos 75a) "It is possible for the Cohen to remove filth with wine vinegar before the Temple service".

Alternatively, the predicate may be inconclusive or it may be stated as an impossibility.

For example, (Pesachim 118a) "In all sales involving credit, it is doubtful whether the money will be forthcoming or not".

(Kesubos 75a) "The Cohen may alleviate foul breath by putting a peppercorn in his mouth and thus not be disqualified from Temple service. However, this option is impossible for a woman because she is in constant contact with her husband".

This category of statements includes the entire range of variations from certainty to possibility and from doubt to impossibility.

3. Statement of Exclusion. In this type of statement the predicate is applied to the subject to the exclusion of any other subject.

For example, (Exodus 12:16) ". . . no manner of work shall be done on them, save that which every person must eat; that alone may be done by you". The permissibility of work is predicated on cases involving what a person needs in order to eat, and excluded from any other case.

4.  Statement of Exception. In this statement the predicate is removed from some elements of the general class which constitutes the subject.

For example, (Chullin 2a) "All may slaughter and their slaughtering is valid except a deaf or insane person or a minor". Here, the deaf, the insane and the minor are included in the class of all Jews; however, they are excluded from the statement that all may slaughter because of the word except.

5.  Conditional Statement. In this kind of statement the predicate is not applicable in all cases; it is conditionally applied to the subject or it is only true in certain respects.

For example, (Yebamos 88a) "When one performs leverite marriage, the woman is his wife in every respect, with the stipulation that her ketubah shall be paid from the estate of her first husband".

Similarly, (Demai Chapter 1 Mishnah 2) "Second tithe money of demai may be exchanged, silver for silver, copper for copper, silver for copper, and copper for fruit - provided that one has in mind to eventually return and redeem the fruit".

6.   Hypothetical Statement. This statement establishes that the existence of one thing is dependent on the presence of another.

For example, (Demai Chapter 4 Mishnah 4) "A man may not deliver his tithes on the Sabbath, but if the Cohen and the poor man regularly eat at his table, then he may give them their tithes to eat on the Sabbath".

(Sukkah 58a) "The Almighty says, if you come into My House, I will come into your house".

In a hypothetical statement we must always differentiate between two distinct parts: the antecedent and the consequent. The Antecedent is the clause which states the condition (in the example above, "if the Cohen and the poor man regularly eat at his table"). The Consequent is the clause which is dependent on this antecedent {"then he may give them their tithes to eat on the Sabbath").

7.  Compound Statement. These statements have two or more predicates with one subject, or one predicate with two or more subjects. This category has two types.

The first type is called a Simple Compound. This includes sentences with multiple predicates, all of which apply to their subject, and likewise sentences with one predicate applying to many subjects at once.

For example, (Kil'ayim Chapter 8 Mishnah 1) "Kil'ayim of the vineyard may not be planted or maintained, and it is forbidden to receive benefit from them". Similarly, (Terumos Chapter 1 Mishnah 7) "It is forbidden to give terumah according to any measure, weight or number". In these two examples the subjects have multiple predicates. The prohibitions of maintaining, planting and receiving benefit are predicated on intermingled plants in the vineyard, and the prohibitions of measuring, weighing and counting are predicated on the separation of terumah.

(Demai Chapter 6 Mishnah 1) "One who rents a field from a Jew, a non-Jew, and a Cuthean may give the landlord his portion untithed". In this example, one predicate (dividing the produce untithed) is applied to three subjects - one who rents from a Cuthean, one who rents from a Jew, and one who rents from a non-Jew.

A simple compound statement has two subcategories: one where the predicates are applied to their subjects with equal significance, as in the above examples, and another in which one part of the compound statement is stated as a novel idea and the other as something obvious or previously self-evident.

For example, (Ma'aser Sheni Chapter 1 Mishnah 2) "An unblemished first-born animal may be sold only when it is alive, but if it is blemished it may be sold alive and also after slaughtering". Here, the fact that a blemished animal may be sold when it is alive is obvious, for even an unblemished animal may be sold while alive. Only the fact that it may also be sold after it is slaughtered is a novel idea. For this is not allowed in the case of an unblemished animal, and so I might think that it is also not allowed in this case.

In the latter subcategory there are two variations. The first is where the self-evident is mentioned before the novel part, and it follows the formula "not only. . . but even. . .", as in the above example (not only alive but even slaughtered). The second is where the novel is mentioned before the self-evident, and it follows the formula "this... and needless to say. . . *.

For example, (Kil'ayim Chapter 8 Mishnah 1) "Kil'ayim of grains and vegetables may not be planted or maintained; however, they may be eaten and all other benefit is surely permitted". Here, that they may be eaten is a novel idea and needless to say other benefit is permissible.

The second type of compound statement is called a Disjunction. This type consists of those sentences whose subject is suspended between two or more predicates, and only one of them is actually applied to the subject.

For example, (Yebamos 112b) "He must perform either chalitzah or leverite marriage".

Both simple compound statements and disjunctive statements are included in the category of compound statement since they have multiple predicates or subjects.

8.  Preclusive Statement. Statements in which one predicate is applied to the subject and another predicate is excluded, or where the predicate is affirmed in one subject and some other subject is rejected.

For example, (Terumos Chapter 11 Mishnah 5) "In the case of terumah, one who sifts a kav or two of fine flour from a se'ah of wheat must not discard the remainder, but must rather put it in a hidden place".

9.  Statement of Discrepancy. There is one subject to which a certain predicate is applied together with another predicate that apparently contradicts the first.

For example, (Ma'aseros Chapter 5 Mishnah 8) "Seeds which are not normally considered food may be eaten by a non-Cohen, even though they came from plants which were terumah". The fact that these seeds come from a stock of terumah is an apparent contradiction to the ruling that they may be eaten by anyone. However, there is, in fact, no conflict.

10.  Comparative Statement. In this statement an assertion is made on the basis of a comparison to some other topic. The rule in this type of sentence is that a known subject is always taken as the basis of comparison, and another unknown subject is equated to it.

For example, (Demai Chapter 6 Mishnah 5) "If a Jew rents olive trees from a Cohen or Levite for the olive oil, he and the landlord share the terumah just as they share the remaining produce". Here, the method of apportioning ordinary produce is according to agreement, and this is known. The apportioning of terumah is equated to it, and the statement affirms their similarity in the case where one rents olive trees for their oil. (In the case where one rents land from a Cohen or Levite the ruling is that the terumah is given entirely to the landlord.)

11.  Consequent Statement. In this statement one predicate is stated as a consequence of another.

For example, (Ma'aseros Chapter 2 Mishnah 1) "When a man in the market passes by saying, 'Take some of my figs to eat', they may be eaten and they are exempt from tithes; therefore, upon bringing these figs into one's house the obligation to tithe is a certainty". The undoubted obligation to tithe is a consequence of the fact that the figs were permissible before being brought into the house. For when an unlearned man carries produce through the market with no specific intent to sell, it is assumed that he never brought it into his own house from the field, and thus there is no obligation to tithe such produce in the marketplace. By the same token, the figs must certainly be tithed by the recipient in his own house since they were under no obligation to be tithed previously.

In addition to being able to differentiate these eleven categories, it is essential to understand that people express their thoughts in words in various styles. Some use many words while others are exceedingly brief. Some people speak literally, while others speak rhetorically or metaphorically. These distinctions are well known in the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric. However, our current concern is simply this: no matter what order or manner of expression is used, when we penetrate the intention of a statement, we discover that the speaker desires to apply a particular predicate to a subject. Otherwise, his words have no substance, and no complete thought can be formed in the mind of the listener. Therefore, do not fix your attention on the manner of speech, but on the intended statement contained in the words. If the expression is condensed, you must supply what is missing in your mind, and if it is more lengthy, you must remove the extraneous parts, forming a conceptual image of the abstracted subject, predicate, and type of predication, as explained above.

For example, (Pesachim lb) Rav Pappi said in Raba's name, one must bless "who has commanded us to remove leaven" and not ^t(who has commanded us concerning the removal of leaven", because the latter implies an action which is already done. This would be invalid since a blessing must be said before the fulfillment of the commandment. An objection was raised from a text which states that on circumcision the blessing is "who has commanded us concerning circumcision". At this point, the Gemorah answers, "In that case how else could he say it? Should he say 'to circumcise'? But is it only the Mohel who may circumcise?" In this answer, the Gemorah uses a concise expression and a rhetorical style. But the content of the statement is simply that the Mohel has no alternative but to bless "concerning circumcision". (This is an exclusive statement.) The reason for this is that, since he is not necessarily the one who must circumcise, it is impossible for him to bless "to circumcise". (This is a consequent statement.) These are the two statements that should be abstracted in your mind from all the words of the Gemorah.

The Gemorah continues, "What can you say in the case where the father circumcises his own son?" Here the abstracted statement is: according to your original understanding, the father should bless "to circumcise" and not "concerning circumcision". (This is a preclusive statement.) According to Rav Pappi, there should be a distinction between the Mohel and the father since it is only in the case of the Mohel that we say he cannot bless "to circumcise" because of the ensuing misconception that the obligation falls primarily on him and not on the father of the child.

The Gemorah answers: "Yes, this is indeed the case". That is to say, it is, in fact, true that the father should say "to circumcise". (This is a simple statement.)

In every text this method of abstraction should be applied.

Chapter Four: JUXTAPOSITION OF STATEMENTS

Chapter Four

Up to this point we have explained those things which may be understood in isolated statements. Now we shall concern ourselves with the juxtaposition of one statement with another. If we consider the arrangement and relationship between two statements we can discern six types, and they are: equivalent, variant, contradictory, converse, obverse and incongruent.